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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PERSPECTIVE

TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON*

I. INTRODUCTION
We applaud Professor Merrill’s bold and noteworthy effort to engage in a
dialogue with political scientists who study the Supreme Court. He navigates a
substantial body of social science scholarship largely ignored by legal scholars,
but he does so with the critical eye of someone who firmly believes that “the
law” matters. The result is keenly and refreshingly original and should
influence work on both sides of the Supreme Court scholarship divide.
The most significant aspect of Merrill’s article is his consideration of the
Supreme Court as an institution. Court studies frequently treat the Court as a
collection of individuals who act in response to personal views; the attitudinal
model that Merrill discusses takes such a classical, micro-level approach. An
institutional perspective, by contrast, emphasizes the influence of interactions
among the Justices, as well as the context within which they make decisions.
Merrill lucidly delineates both the internal and external aspects of institutional
analysis. We wish to add an element to the Merrill model that we believe
enriches it without diminishing its parsimony. The external characteristic that
we consider is the Supreme Court’s organizational relationship with lower
courts, particularly courts of appeals.
Like Congress, the Supreme Court must delegate a great deal of its work,
in this case to lower courts rather than to agencies. Since the Supreme Court is
formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions can be
conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents, the
lower courts. The Supreme Court has limited resources to monitor the actions
of lower federal courts and state courts; therefore, the possibility arises that
judges will not comply with Supreme Court preferences. The Court obviously
wishes to check these inconsistent rulings, but monitoring and enforcement is
costly. We consider what the theory of congressional-bureaucratic relations

* Tracey E. George is Professor of Law and Albert H. Yoon is Assistant Professor of Law and
Assistant Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Northwestern University. We thank
William Hof and the other members of the Saint Louis University Law Journal staff for their
outstanding work on the Childress Lecture events.
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can tell us about the Supreme Court’s relational contract with lower courts,
and, in particular, we consider whether it offers additional insight to the
transition from the first to the second Rehnquist Court.
II. THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The United States Supreme Court is a constitutionally mandated national
court that has ultimate authority over federal constitutional questions and final
judicial say on interpretation of federal statutes. The Court’s power, therefore,
is immense. Its capacity for exercising that power, however, is constrained: As
Merrill observes, it can consider annually only a limited number of disputes.1
The Court greatly widens the scope of its power by delegating to lower courts.
Congress has created an expansive federal judiciary that can assist the Supreme
Court, and states have established separate court systems that can also
implement Justices’ rulings. In order to understand the consequences of the
Supreme Court’s delegation of its authority to lower courts, we can look to the
extensive literature on congressional delegation to administrative agencies.
The dominant theory of the congressional-bureaucratic system draws on
the principal-agent model of economics.2 The model addresses a situation
where one party (the agent) takes an action on behalf of another party (the
principal). The authority relation is a type of contractual arrangement whereby
the principal assigns limited powers to an agent in order to increase efficiency.3
The agent has distinct interests that may be in conflict with the principal’s.
The theory explains that the principal cannot perfectly control the agent’s
behavior, but can minimize conflicts through monitoring and incentives that
form part of the agreement.4 The principal-agent model clarifies several key

1. Thomas M. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 578 (2003).
2. While the principal-agent relationship in law is roughly analogous to principal-agent
theory, it is a distinct construct. Here, we are referring to a particular paradigm developed in
economics and political science that examines the relationship of individuals with related
authority but conflicting interests. See Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28
AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984). For early applications to public administration, see Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Barry M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency:
The Policing “Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1975); Barry R.
Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 44 PUB.
CHOICE 147 (1984).
3. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937)
(setting forth, in the landmark article on organizational theory, an explanation for the existence of
firms and a contractual account of firm hierarchical structure).
4. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780-83 (1972) (developing the related concepts of
shirking and monitoring in an organization).
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features of organizational relationships: the probability of conflicting interests,5
the need for mechanisms of control,6 and the crucial value of information.7
Bureaucrats act pursuant to statutory authority, but derive utility from
making decisions that they prefer.8 Bureaucrats’ preferences may align with
Congress’s, but a major influence on legislators’ preferences—election—is
absent.9 Congress cannot write statutes that are sufficiently detailed to
constrain agencies completely. Bureaucrats have opportunities to extract rents
or to shirk as a consequence of discretion coupled with information
asymmetries.10 The principal-agent model helps us to conceptualize the
politician-bureaucrat relation, as Moe explains, because it
focuses on information asymmetry and, in particular, on information available
to bureaucrats—about their true “types” (honesty, personal goals, policy
positions) and their true performance—that politicians do not automatically
possess and often can only acquire with much imprecision and expense. It
then encourages us to inquire into the monitoring devices and incentive
structures—aspects of institutional design—that mitigate the asymmetry and
thus minimize the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that will
otherwise cause bureaucrats to depart from their political directives.11

5. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (“The problem of
inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.
It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts . . . .”).
6. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT (1992); GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF HIERARCHY (1992).
7. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Control in Large Organizations, 10 MGMT. SCI. 397, 404 (1964)
(explaining why managers in large organizations will lack information about activities and the
costs associated with communicating information within an organization).
8. The literature generally assumes that agents have their own utility function that is related
to “private political values, personal career objectives, or, all else being equal, an aversion to
effort.” David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and
Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 n.2 (1994). Legislators can seek to control
bureaucrats’ preferences by selecting only like-minded agents to staff agencies. Randall L.
Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 59091, 593-95 (1989) (presenting a game theoretic analysis of agency control by well-chosen
appointments). Of course, this is a power limited by the reality of the appointments and hiring
process and the problem of adverse selection. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-37 (1989).
9. See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR
DISTRICTS (1978); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
10. See generally JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (1997); MILLER, supra note 6, at 123-25;
Moe, supra note 2, at 755.
11. Moe, supra note 2, at 766.
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The Supreme Court and lower federal courts are in an analogous agency
relationship.12 The Court enunciates doctrine that is effectuated by lower
courts. The Court is not capable of deciding cases that cover all possible sets
of case facts, nor of writing decisions that are sufficiently explicit to allow for
only one outcome in a particular dispute.13 Thus, lower court judges may
make decisions that are different from those that the Court would otherwise
have made. Circuit and district judges have their own preferences that reflect
many factors, including policy goals, legal perspective, professional objectives,
and personal desires.14 If those preferences are congruent with the Court’s
majority, then the judge will have no incentive to depart from the Court’s
preferences. If the preferences are divergent, a judge has an incentive to make
a non-complying ruling.
The Supreme Court’s obvious mechanism of control over lower court
judges is reversal of their decisions. Likewise, the circuit judge’s decision to
make a decision on her ideal point, rather than the Court’s, will be affected by
the availability of sanctions and the probability that she will be caught.15 That
is, a judge will consider the probability of reversal by the Supreme Court.
Although the likelihood of reversal is relatively small given the Court’s limited
caseload, the cost of reversal may be perceived as higher than a rational actor
model would dictate.16 For example, lower court judges who aspire to
promotion to a higher court know that their success will depend in part on an
evaluation of the number of times they have been reversed.17

12. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model
of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994); Matt Spitzer & Eric
Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000).
13. See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME
COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986); Bradley C.
Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 109 (1973).
14. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161-62 (1921)
(observing that a judge, though not wholly free, has sufficiently wide discretion and will exercise
it based on “all his ingredients”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2, 31-39 (1993).
15. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 2, at 249 (1987) (describing how the presence
of sanctions multiplied by the likelihood of detection will deter noncompliance by agents).
16. Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a
Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1978) (finding that stigma results from reversal); Lawrence
Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86
(1976); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994).
17. For an example, we need look no further than recently confirmed Bush nominee, Dennis
Shedd. See Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed
Nominees, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations_appeals.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2003)
(reporting that the Senate confirmed Shedd on November 19 with fifty-five ayes and forty-four
nays). New Fourth Circuit Judge Shedd was questioned during his Senate Judiciary Committee
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Some scholars have concluded that administrative agencies are essentially
autonomous because Congress reviews very few agency decisions, plays a
limited role in selecting administrative employees, and generally ignores
agency operations.18 We could make the same assertion about lower federal
courts’ relationship with the Rehnquist Court. The Rehnquist Court reviews
very few lower court rulings—less than one-half of 1% of circuit decisions.
The Court has no role in the selection of circuit and district judges. Thus, we
may conclude that circuit courts are basically free to do as they please.
Consider, for example, that popular commentaries have frequently described
the Ninth Circuit during the Rehnquist Era as a runaway court.19
Infrequent review, however, does not necessarily mean rogue agents. The
most obvious point is one of observational equivalence:20 The Rehnquist Court
may be reviewing fewer cases because lower courts are hewing closely to the
Court’s preferred positions. Even if lower courts have conflicting interests,
they may be constrained by actions other than the risk of direct Supreme Court
review of their rulings. In the public administration literature, scholars have
demonstrated that legislatures use the language of statutes and the delineation
of procedures to constrain agencies.21 Likewise, the Rehnquist Court may use

hearing about a decision he made as a South Carolina district judge that was ultimately reversed
by the Supreme Court. Jonathan Groner, ‘Pledge’ Case Stokes Debate: Judicial Nominations
Rhetoric Flies After Ruling. Also, Shedd Gets Hearing for Fourth Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, July 1,
2002, at 16 (reporting Senate hearing questions regarding Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.
S.C. 1997), aff’d, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)).
18. See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
19. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 1; Ashbel S. Green, Justice O’Connor Chides 9th Circuit for Frequently
Reversed Decisions, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 20, 1997, at C5; Martin Kasindorf, The Court
Conservatives Hate, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2003, at A3.
20. Weingast and Moran made this argument about Congress: “[T]he evidence marshalled to
support the theory of agency independence—namely, the infrequency and superficiality of
congressional hearings and investigations—is also consistent with a theory of congressional
control of regulatory policy.” Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, The Myth of Runaway
Bureaucracy: The Case of the FTC, REG., May/June 1982, at 33, 34. Weingast and Moran
considered the case of the FTC in the 1970s, when it was considered by many to be a classic case
of a runaway agency. They conclude that turnover and change in the composition of the Senate
committee with oversight (the subcommittee on consumer affairs) reveals that the FTC was not
out of line with the Senate preferences, as reflected in the relevant committee—until near the end
of the 70s and early 80s. Id. at 33-38.
21. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS
(1999); JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002) (arguing that legislatures use specificity in
statutory language to micromanage bureaucracy and testing this theory against state laws on
Medicaid); McCubbins et al., supra note 8 (showing that Congress controls substantive output of
agencies through the specification of procedures).
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the language of its decisions and the structure of doctrine to limit options of
lower courts.
How does the Supreme Court learn whether the courts of appeals are
reaching decisions that conflict with the Court’s preferences? For perfect
enforcement, the Court would review every decision of the courts of appeals.
The sheer volume of circuit decisions, however, make micromanagement
infeasible. The Court must instead look for signals in individual cases and
look more carefully at petitions in those cases. The Court also can decide to
monitor certain circuits closely: those circuits with which it expects to disagree
or that are likely to give it fodder for watershed rulings.
The Rehnquist Court may also be relying on others to alert them to
divergent lower court rulings. McCubbins and Schwartz argued that Congress
does not need to patrol all agency decisions because it can rely on fire alarms
sounded by interested parties.22 Businesses and state governments have been
particularly active in the past two decades, resulting in the availability of
experienced, credible parties with compatible interests to inform the Court.23
In turn, the Rehnquist Court, like previous Courts, has been more likely to
grant review to a case in which interest groups, as amici curiae or litigants,
urge review.24
The Rehnquist Court may be looking for signals from the circuits
themselves.25 Monitoring the decisions of each circuit to learn if any threejudge or en banc panels have breached the agency agreement, however, is
difficult and consumes limited resources. The Court will be more likely to
learn of a breach when a circuit judge dissents because that judge has access to
greater information than the Justices and has an incentive to set forth in an
opinion reasons for Supreme Court review. Moreover, the mere fact of a
dissent signals to the Court that it may justifiably expend resources to review
the case or, at least, to look more closely at the petition for certiorari.26 Studies
22. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984); see also Weingast, supra note
2 (arguing that Congress monitors bureaucrats by constituency “decibel meters”).
23. See Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. &
POL. 639 (1993).
24. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest
Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335 (John B. Gates & Charles A.
Johnson eds., 1991).
25. Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., One Principal and Multiple Agents: Supreme Court Auditing
of the United States Courts of Appeals (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
26. See Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718,
719 (1987) (explaining that dissents are often considered by majority judges as signals to the
Supreme Court that the case is worthy of a grant of certiorari); see also Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998) (arguing that, under a
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also have found that a circuit court’s reversal of a lower court or agency’s
decision,27 as well as en banc hearing, may act as a signal to the Supreme
Court that the case presents an issue demanding an authoritative review.28
A circuit court’s composition may be another signal that a decision
conflicts with the Court majority’s position. The courts of appeals affect the
Supreme Court’s agenda when they make decisions with which the Court
disagrees, requiring the Court to take action to correct.29 One would expect,
under this model, an ideologically conscious Court to grant review and then
reverse divergent opinions in the lower courts. Thus, the changes in the
Rehnquist Court’s docket may reflect changes in circuit courts.
The circuits also can influence the Court’s agenda by anticipating or
moving ahead of the Court on certain issues, taking the lead on new legal
questions or new approaches. Thus, the Court also can decide to monitor
closely circuits that are likely to give it fodder for watershed rulings.
III. REHNQUIST COURT MONITORING OF CIRCUIT COURTS
In the principal-agent model, Supreme Court Justices utilize certiorari
review to monitor the activities of its agents, namely court of appeals judges
applying Supreme Court doctrine. As previously mentioned, one would
expect, under this model, the Court to grant review and then reverse divergent
opinions in the lower courts. If the Supreme Court uses certiorari primarily as
a means of controlling recalcitrant circuits, it should reverse most of the
decisions that it reviews. There is, in fact, a significant body of work that
establishes exactly this pattern.30
sophisticated model of judicial behavior, circuit judges are most likely to dissent when a panel
reaches a decision that is contrary both to existing Court precedent and to their preferences).
27. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24 (observing that judicial clerks’ memoranda on
certiorari regularly note a circuit’s reversal and presenting systematic evidence that the Court,
statistically, is significantly more likely to grant certiorari when the appeals court reversed the
lower court or agency).
28. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United
States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 S. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 195-197 (2001) (finding that the
Supreme Court was more likely to review a en banc decision than a panel ruling).
29. For a development and empirical test of this model, see Charles M. Cameron et al.,
Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s
Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Virginia C. Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the
Warren and Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141, 149 (1982) (finding
that the Burger Court was more likely to grant certiorari to liberal appeals from court rulings in
civil liberties and economic liberties cases, and the Warren Court was more likely to grant
certiorari in conservative economic liberties cases, but not in conservative civil liberties disputes);
Robert L. Boucher, Jr., & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision
Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995)
(examining certiorari and merits votes of Vinson Court Justices from 1946 through 1952 and
finding that Justices who voted to reverse a lower court decision were significantly more likely to
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Both Rehnquist Courts, like past Supreme Courts, reversed the majority of
circuit court decisions that they reviewed, but the second Rehnquist Court was
much more likely to reverse circuit decisions.31 The second Rehnquist Court
has achieved a reversal rate that is 11% higher than the first Rehnquist Court’s,
as reflected in Table 1. Of particular interest, the second Rehnquist Court was
much more likely to reverse liberal appeals court rulings (a 16.1% increase in
reversals of liberal rulings as compared to a 5.5% increase in reversals of
conservative rulings). If the rate of reversal had increased without regard to
ideology, then the second Rehnquist Court would, on average, be overturning
liberal cases 66.2% of the time and conservative decisions 59.4% of the time,
rather than 69.4% and 56.7%, respectively.

have voted for certiorari than Justices who voted to affirm); Saul Brenner & John F. Krol,
Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 832-833
(1989) (concluding, based on a sample of cases from selected terms of the Vinson, Warren, and
Burger Courts, that Justices who voted in favor of certiorari were more likely to vote to reverse
than Justices who opposed certiorari, termed an “error-correcting strategy”).
31. We rely on the Spaeth Supreme Court Database for calculation of figures reflected here.
See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2001
Terms, at http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/sctdata1.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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TABLE 1
Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Rehnquist I vs. Rehnquist II

REVERSALS OF LOWER COURT

Liberal

All
Circuits

Conservative
Total
Liberal

FOURTH
CIRCUIT

Conservative
Total
Liberal

Ninth
Circuit

Conservative
Total

REHNQUIST I
59.8%
(222)
53.7%
(186)
56.9%

REHNQUIST II
69.4%
(197)
56.7%
(157)
63.0%

66.7 %
(16)
45.5%
(15)
54.4%

76.9%
(10)
62.2%
(23)
66.0%

66.3%
(63)
42.3%
(18)
59.1%

78.2%
(79)
70.7%
(29)
76.1%

All data drawn from the Spaeth Supreme Court Database.
The number in parentheses is the total number of cases in that cell.

In order to get a sense of what is happening at a circuit level, we break out
the two circuits currently described as the most ideologically extreme in Table
1, and we compare the change in reversal rates for all circuits in Figure 2. The
change between the first and second Rehnquist Courts is most evident in its
treatment of the most conservative circuit, the Fourth, and the most liberal, the
Ninth.32 The Fourth Circuit generated the second highest number of Supreme

32. See David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes Over a Federal
Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at A13 (reporting battle between Fourth Circuit
senators over circuit seen as extremely conservative); Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model
of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES., May 24, 1999, at A1 (describing the Fourth Circuit as
“the boldest conservative court in the nation, in the view of scholars, lawyers and many of its own
members”).
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Court cases during the second Rehnquist Court (fifty) and one of the highest
reversal rates (66%). The second Rehnquist Court reviewed more than twice
as many conservative Fourth Circuit cases as liberal ones. The Court,
however, did not do so to adopt the lower court’s position: It reversed more
than 62% of the Fourth Circuit’s conservative decisions between 1994 to 2001,
compared to approximately 57% of all conservative circuit cases during that
period, and less than 46% of Fourth Circuit conservative rulings between 1986
and 1993.33 One well-known example of the Supreme Court restraining the
conservative lower court is Dickerson v. United States in which seven Justices,
in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Fourth
Circuit’s decision that a federal statute effectively overruled Miranda rights.34

33. For a discussion of the 1999-2000 term, see Marcia Coyle, Fourth Circuit No Longer a
Star Pupil, NAT’L L.J., July 10, 2000, at A4.
34. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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FIGURE 2
Supreme Court Reversal Rates of Circuits
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The Ninth Circuit, with twenty-eight active judgeships and nearly five
thousand merits rulings annually, is easily the largest court of appeals and,
likely, the most liberal.35 The first Rehnquist Court reversed the Ninth Court
slightly more often than average (59.1% compared to 56.9%), but less
frequently than four other circuits, as shown in Figure 2. Under the second
Rehnquist Court, the Ninth Circuit is by far the most reviewed and the most
reversed court of appeals.36 The reason, however, is not only liberal rulings:
The Supreme Court reviewed forty-one conservative Ninth Circuit rulings,
overturning twenty-nine. Yet, the Court is much more likely to hear
challenges to liberal Ninth Circuit holdings and to side with the challengers.
One reasonable inference to draw from the reversal rate evidence is that
the second Rehnquist Court was more efficiently and effectively monitoring
35. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United
States Courts, 2001, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/contents.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2003) (reporting the number of judgeships and cases in 2001 term); Michelle Munn, Don’t Split
9th Circuit, House Panel Is Told, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2002, § 2, at 8 (describing how debate
over dividing the court is dominated by accusations of ideological bias in its decisionmaking).
36. At the beginning of the current term, the unanimous Supreme Court summarily reversed
three Ninth Circuit rulings all in one day. See Jason Hoppin, Ninth Circuit Reversed Three Times
in One Day, S.F. RECORDER, Nov. 5, 2002, at 1.
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lower courts, granting review to cases that were more likely to be divergent.
The Court focused on the outlier circuits, and, therefore, it could hear fewer
cases to monitor. This conclusion is consistent with Merrill’s analysis of the
second Rehnquist Court as a more stable one.37 The first Rehnquist Court
reviewed more circuit cases on average (ninety) than the second (seventy).
The relative decline in circuit cases (22%), however, was lower than the
decline in cases from other courts (50%). Again, informative differences can
be seen by looking at the circuit level.

37. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 638-51.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM

831

FIGURE 3
Rehnquist I (1986-1993) Percentage Points Over/Under-represented in
Supreme Court Docket
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FIGURE 4
Rehnquist II (1994-2001) Percentage Points Over/Under-represented in
Supreme Court Docket
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IV. CIRCUIT COURTS INFLUENCING THE REHNQUIST COURT
Congress, on some occasions, grants regulatory agencies discretion in
order to allow for experimentation or development in policies that Congress
can later codify in statute. We can observe the same behavior in the second
Rehnquist Court. As Merrill delineates, the second Rehnquist Court can be
defined by the changes it has made in federalism doctrine.38 We consider how
this substantive shift followed decisions of lower courts in federalism cases.
The watershed case of the second Rehnquist Court must be United States
v. Lopez.39 The Fifth Circuit panel that heard the case described it as one of
first impression: a challenge to the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990.40 The panel had one Reagan appointee, William Garwood,
and two Carter appointees, Thomas Reavley and Carolyn Dineen King. The
judges unanimously reversed the defendant’s conviction on the ground that
Congress had overstepped its Commerce Clause authority in passing the Act.
In so doing, the panel acknowledged that it knew “of no Supreme Court
decision in the last half century that has set aside such a finding as without
rational basis. However, the Court has never renounced responsibility to
invalidate legislation as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.”41 The
decision is ideologically mixed: It rules for the criminal defendant, typically a
liberal outcome, while ruling against federal government encroachment on
state powers, traditionally a conservative position.
The panel’s decision was greeted with much criticism as well as praise, but
most notably with a great deal of publicity because it marked a rare occasion
when a federal court struck down a federal statute as unconstitutional based on
the Commerce Clause. Despite the weightiness of the decision, the Fifth
Circuit did not proceed en banc as requested by the losing U.S. Attorney.42 A
Ninth Circuit panel addressed the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zone Act within a few months, and it explicitly disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit’s holding.43 Ninth Circuit Judge Alarcon communicated that there was

38. See id. at 584-85.
39. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
41. See id. at 1364 n.43 (emphasis added).
42. United States v. Lopez, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993) (reporting without explanation the
circuit’s denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc).
43. United States. v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated & remanded by,
514 U.S. 1093 (1995) (recognizing that the panel’s decision “will create an intercircuit conflict
with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion”). The Edwards panel held that the case was controlled by a prior
Ninth Circuit case that could only be overturned by the en banc circuit. The panel, however, did
not recommend en banc hearing because “we disagree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Lopez.”
Id. After Lopez, five district judges also issued published opinions on the constitutionality of the
Gun-Free School Zone Act: three finding the Act within the Commerce Clause power, two
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a breach of the relational agreement: “With respect, we believe the Fifth
Circuit has misinterpreted, or refused to follow, the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court that are binding on all courts inferior to our nation’s
highest court.”44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the circuit split, perhaps
responding to arguments from many sources that the Fifth Circuit had acted
outside its authority. The resulting opinions reflect circuit and district court
opinions on the Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion,
discussed at much greater length the history of America’s federalist system,
but ultimately accepted Garwood’s analysis. The Supreme Court had the
benefit of a full consideration of all arguments for and against the
constitutionality of the Act, and it accepted the position of a panel that to many
appeared to be a runaway. In fact, the panel had correctly anticipated the
majority’s position.45
The developments in the circuit courts are not always in line with changes
in the Supreme Court. Merrill describes the sharp decline in social issues
relative to federalism issues on the Court docket as a telling distinction
between the two eras.46 For example, the Court heard five substantive abortion
cases in the 1986-1993 period, but only one from 1994 to 2001.47 The number
of published abortion decisions in the circuit courts increased between the two
periods (from twenty-six cases to forty), even controlling for the increase in
lower court caseload.48 The lower courts could not refuse to hear these cases,
but they could have selected to issue unpublished rulings as is usual in cases
involving settled legal questions.
However, the one Supreme Court abortion ruling after 1993, Stenberg v.
Carhart,49 is a good example of the Court’s role as monitor of lower courts.

adopting Lopez’s position. Compare United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994),
United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994), and United States v. Holland, 841
F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993), with United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Kan. 1994)
(“With due respect to the Ninth Circuit, the court finds the views articulated by the Fifth Circuit
to be more faithful to the values of federalism embodied in our Constitution.”), and United States
v. Morrow, 834 F.Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1993). The most striking conflict was that two Kansas
defendants, Glover and Trigg, who were accomplices, but were tried separately, found themselves
with opposite outcomes.
44. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294.
45. In a later Commerce Clause case, the divided en banc Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Morrison made a dramatic ruling that the Supreme Court ultimately accepted. Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The en banc court reversed a contrary panel ruling. See
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
46. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 580-85, 581 fig.3.
47. Id. at 654 app.A.
48. These numbers reflect a search of the Westlaw Court of Appeals Database.
49. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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Stenberg involved a ban on “partial birth abortions.” Five circuit courts had
struck down state partial birth abortion bans as unconstitutionally vague or
imposing an undue burden on a women’s right of privacy.50 The only circuit to
reach a different conclusion was the Seventh Circuit in a closely divided en
banc case, Hope Clinic v. Ryan.51 Judge Frank Easterbrook, a well-known
jurist and scholar, authored the majority opinion. Judge Richard Posner, an
even better known jurist and scholar, penned for the four dissenters, claiming
in the end that his analysis was based on “[t]he Constitution as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in decisions that we are not free to palter with.”52 The
Supreme Court agreed with Posner and the five circuits.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Merrill ably demonstrates that Supreme Court decisions should
be examined as the product of an inherently political institution. Observers
who assert that Justices are best understood as prophets of the law are
practicing an intellectual sleight of hand that allows them to ignore the nondoctrinal factors that affect judicial behavior. Such an effort is understandable.
The Court is a much more complicated subject if its rulings reflect nonlegal
factors as well as legal ones. The desire, however, to ignore the true character
of the Court produces accounts of its behavior that are inadequate, incorrect, or
wholly without content.
Legal scholars who want to explain court decisions must consider closely
the analysis offered by Merrill as well as his methodology. Moreover, scholars
who wish to prescribe legal rules without understanding Merrill’s arguments
risk folly for they fail to consider how rules are adopted and applied by courts.

50. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of Greater
Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.
1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999); Summitt Med.
Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
51. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacated summarily, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
52. Id. at 890 (Posner, J., dissenting).

